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Google Sets Sail: Ocean-Based Server Farms and
International Law
STEVEN R. SWANSON
In recent years, the oceans have become a venue for nontraditional
uses such as rocket launches, fish farming, and energy production. In
2009, the United States Patent and Trademark Office granted Google a
patent for an ocean-based server farm, powered and cooled by the seas’
wind and water. A server farm is simply a collection of computers joined
together on a network providing services to remotely connected users.
Google argued that the transportability of these server ships would allow
easy movement to world regions where such services are needed. In
addition, the data center ship would provide a relatively green alternative
to power-hungry server farms located on land.
If these massive server farms populate the oceans, what regulatory
schemes will apply? The server ship’s owner may understandably seek the
ability to avoid national exercises of jurisdiction. Internet theorists have
traditionally resisted state jurisdiction, arguing that cyberspace should
provide its own norms. This early view has recently been undercut by
successful state exercises of control over various Internet players and the
development of new technology allowing geographic segmentation of
Internet content and use.
This Article will consider and evaluate international law’s probable
application to state jurisdiction over these server ships and other
innovative technologies just beyond view. It argues that the international
community should resist additional abridgements of high seas freedoms to
address issues relating to server ships or other new maritime uses, absent
a compelling international need for additional regulation.
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Google Sets Sail: Ocean-Based Server Farms and
International Law
STEVEN R. SWANSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet pioneers saw a cyberworld free from national boundaries.
Traditional notions of the nation-state system, with its dependence on
territorial jurisdictional control, would simply become irrelevant in the
online world, which could create its own norms to control unwanted
Internet behavior without state-sovereignty restrictions.1 Unfortunately for
these utopian theorists, the world’s nations had an entirely different vision,
finding diverse ways to exercise power over the Internet game’s significant
players.2 Although a particular website might not be subject to a state’s
jurisdiction, the Internet service provider allowing local access to that site
might be. Companies providing search engines or financial transactions on
the Internet might find themselves subject to local restrictions. In addition,
entities with property or personnel in the regulating country might be
coerced into compliance.3 The Internet does not just exist in the ether; its
physical manifestations exist within many countries, making cyberspace
vulnerable to the state jurisdiction that Internet theorists had hoped to
avoid.
Even as the cyberworld has opened its doors, technology has
multiplied the ways that human beings use the seas. Plans are underway to
build the nation’s first ocean-based wind farm off Rhode Island’s coast.4
Fish farming in deep offshore waters is beginning to look like it may
become economically feasible.5 Discussions are underway about how to

* Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law, Yale Law School, LL.M., Vanderbilt
University School of Law, J.D., Bowdoin College, A.B. The author wishes to express his appreciation
for the excellent research efforts of Maira Gavioli and the support and helpful comments from
Professor Carol Swanson.
1
See infra notes 221–26 and accompanying text.
2
See infra notes 227–31 and accompanying text.
3
See infra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
4
Deepwater Wind To Build First U.S. Ocean Wind Farm, CNET NEWS (Dec. 11, 2009),
http://msn-cnet.com.com/8301-11128_3-10413743-54.html?part=msn-cnet&subj=ns&tag=feed. The
wind farm will be made up of eight turbines providing twenty-eight megawatts of electricity. Another
facility has been planned off the coast of Massachusetts, but has been slowed by protests. Id.
5
See John McQuaid, In Search of New Waters, Fish Farming Moves Offshore, YALE ENV’T 360
(Dec. 3, 2009), http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2216 (reviewing recent attempts to create
deep sea fish farms).
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create livable settlements on the high seas. Russia is considering building
floating nuclear power stations to power its arctic oil and gas exploration
efforts.7 Spacecraft are even blasting off from the high seas.8
Given these newfound maritime uses, it is not surprising that Internet
stakeholders are looking to the seas as a place to locate, and perhaps
protect, their businesses. For example, in 2007, the owners of The Pirate
Bay, a notorious Swedish illegal file-sharing operation, wanted to locate its
servers on the Principality of Sealand, a self-declared independent state on
a deserted British defense platform in the Atlantic Ocean.9 By locating its
servers on this metallic “sovereign” nation, The Pirate Bay hoped to avoid
national laws that prohibited its file-sharing service.10 Ultimately the deal
fell through,11 but efforts persisted to isolate servers and the valuable
information that they may contain.
On February 26, 2007, Google filed for a U.S. patent on a “waterbased data center.”12 The patent application covered “a floating platformmounted computer data center comprising a plurality of computing units, a
sea-based electrical generator in electrical connection with the plurality of
computing units, and one or more sea-water cooling units for providing
cooling to the plurality of computing units.”13 In layman’s terms, the
patent sought to create container-based server units located on the water,
powered and cooled by the ocean itself. These units could be combined in
multiple configurations and moved to new locations with relative ease.14
The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which
produced the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
6
See Ted Chamberlain, Future Sea Cities: Freedom’s Final Frontier in Pictures, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2009/05/photogalleries/seasteading-seabuildings-pictures/index.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (reporting on design contest for homesteads
on the seas).
7
John Vidal, Russia To Build Floating Arctic Nuclear Stations, OBSERVER, May 3, 2009, at 13
(describing the Russian plan and environmentalists’ concerns).
8
Sea Launch, partially owned by Boeing, is in the business of launching payloads from a seabased platform into equatorial orbit. Cruising to Orbit: Why Sea Launch, SEA LAUNCH,
http://www.sea-launch.com/why_sea_launch.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). The last launch of a
satellite from the sea was a communications satellite on April 20, 2009. Cruising to Orbit: History,
SEA LAUNCH, http://www.sea-launch.com/history.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
9
Darren Murph, The Pirate Bay Eying Sealand To Escape Digital Persecution, ENGADGET (Jan.
14, 2007, 8:45 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2007/01/14/the-pirate-bay-eying-sealand-to-escapedigital-persecution. The micro-nation had previously hosted HavenCo, which hosted gambling and
other financial ventures seeking freedom from state jurisdiction. Id. For additional discussion of
Sealand, see Kevin Fayle, Note, Sealand Ho! Music Pirates, Data Havens, and the Future of
International Copyright Law, 28 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 247, 260–63 (2005).
10
See Murph, supra note 9 (“Sealand could be a potential sanctuary from the claws of the RIAA,
MPAA, and other content ‘owners.’”).
11
Jared Moya, The Pirate Bay Abandons Plans for a Sovereign Nation, ZERO PAID (Feb. 22,
2007), http://www.zeropaid.com/news/8442/the_pirate_bay_abandons_plans_for_a_sovereign_nation.
12
Water-Based Data Ctr., U.S. Patent No. 7,525,207 (filed Feb. 26, 2007) (issued Apr. 28, 2009).
13
Id.
14
Id.

2011]

GOOGLE SETS SAIL

713

15

(“UNCLOS”), met from 1973–1982. Although the UNCLOS was
successful in codifying and moving forward the international law of the
sea, it did not anticipate the radical changes in sea usage that have
subsequently occurred. After all, the world’s oceans had been used for a
limited number of purposes. Transportation of goods and passengers and
fishing were early traditional uses.16 Over time, navies plied the oceans in
support of national goals, and communications cables ran across ocean
floors.17 More recently, the seas have provided a source for the exploration
and exploitation of natural resources and scientific study.18 The oceans
have also served as a venue for human recreation.19 The UNCLOS’s
provisions understandably attempted to provide an overarching set of
norms to regulate these routine activities, but these provisions present an
awkward framework for today’s myriad high-tech uses.
This Article will explore the legal implications of an ocean-based
server farm, beginning with a review of server farms’ unique problems and
how Google’s approach may help to solve some of them. The next
segment will consider traditional international law rules relating to the
state’s ability to prescribe conduct like the server farms envisioned under
15

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. To date, the United States has not ratified the convention, although it
considers many of its provisions to be customary international law. See Statement of President Reagan
on United States Ocean Policy, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 383, 383 (Mar. 10, 1983) (“[T]he
convention also contains provisions with respect to traditional uses of the oceans which generally
confirm existing maritime law and practice and fairly balance the interests of all states.”). The Obama
administration has indicated that it will seek Senate approval of the treaty. Ben Block, U.S. Leaders
Support Law of the Sea Treaty, WORLDWATCH INST. (Jan. 22, 2009), http://www.worldwatch.org/
node/5993.
16
See, e.g., 1 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 2 (7th ed. 1985) (“In those days, a merchant would
often travel by sea with his goods and merchandise, and sometimes there might be more than one such
merchant in a ship.”). Recent research shows that medieval fisherman plied the ocean waters as early
as 1000 A.D., due to diminishing fresh water stocks. Mark Kinver, Study Unlocks History of the Seas,
BBC NEWS (May 24, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8058351.stm. The origins of
maritime law are quite ancient and can be found in nearly every culture. In those days, maritime law
was necessary to regulate trade and travel. 1 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra, § 2 (“The practice of
these seafarers and merchants gave rise to customary law.”).
17
See, e.g., United States of America Statement in Right of Reply (Mar. 8, 1983), in 17 THIRD
UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: OFFICIAL RECORDS 243, 244 (1984) (“[A]ll States
continue to enjoy in the zone traditional high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight and the laying
of submarine cables and pipelines . . . .”). The United States’ interpretation of UNCLOS recognizes
laying of submarine cables and conducting military operations, exercises, and activities as
“internationally lawful uses of the sea.” Id.
18
See, e.g., Craig H. Allen, Protecting the Oceanic Gardens of Eden: International Law Issues in
Deep-Sea Vent Resource Conservation and Management, 13 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 563, 565–67
(2001) (discussing the possibility of obtaining resources from deep sea vents); Mary Turnipseed et al.,
The Silver Anniversary of the United States’ Exclusive Economic Zone: Twenty-Five Years of Ocean
Use and Abuse, and the Possibility of a Blue Water Public Trust Doctrine, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 4–7
(2009) (discussing the dangers of exploitation of natural resources in the oceans).
19
See, e.g., 10 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 1.01 (2009) (“[A]lthough only 11.3% of Americans
have ever taken a cruise . . . 56% have expressed an interest in doing so in the next five years.”). The
cruise industry in the United States is currently a $12 billion per year business, with more than five
million passengers per year. Id.
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the Google patent. The Article will then review UNCLOS’s embodiment
of the law of the sea to determine whether those rules adequately address
unexpected issues presented by rapidly-changing technology, as informed
by the analogous attempts to control pirate radio stations outside national
jurisdiction. In combating the pirate radio problem, the UNCLOS confers
on states a right to arrest pirate radio vessels that contravene the exclusive
flag state jurisdiction over its registered vessels. When combined with the
UNCLOS’s extension of state jurisdiction over large areas of traditional
high seas, this suggests a willingness to undercut high seas freedoms that
have long been the core of the law of the sea. The Article concludes that
the international legal community should be cautious about further limiting
traditional notions of freedom of the sea in order to regulate these new
maritime uses, particularly when there are less intrusive options.
II. SERVER FARMS CAST OFF
A. What Is a Server Farm?
Put simply, a server is a computer designed to provide information or
processes to other computers on a network,20 and a server farm, also
known as a data center, is a group of servers in one location connected by a
network.21 With the advent of cloud computing, the need for powerful
remote storage facilities is bound to increase at a rapid rate.22 Cloud
computing takes much of what was traditionally done on the local
computer to remotely-located computer servers.23 In the past, the remote
server would only be the information source; in the future, the cloud will
likely run remotely-located applications, supplying the product to the local
user.24 In addition, users are much more likely to store their data, or at
least back it up, on the cloud.25 The growth of such applications and
20
Bradley Mitchell, Server, ABOUT.COM, http://compnetworking.about.com/od/basicnetworking
concepts/g/network_servers.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (defining “server”).
21
N. Madison, What Is a Server Farm?, WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-serverfarm.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (outlining the basic features and purposes of server farms).
22
LUIZ ANDRÉ BARROSO & URS HÖLZLE, THE DATACENTER AS A COMPUTER: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE DESIGN OF WAREHOUSE-SCALE MACHINES 1–5 (2009),
http://www.morganclaypool.com/doi/abs/10.2200/S00193ED1V01Y200905CAC006
(featuring
a
discussion of two Google employees on the future of large scale server farms). “[Cloud computing]
refers to companies building massive computing power and then renting that capacity out to other
firms.” Server Farms Becoming a Cash Crop in the Midwest, REDORBIT (May 7, 2008),
http://www.redorbit.com/news/technology/1374175/server_farms_becoming_a_cash_crop_in_the_mid
west.
23
See BARROSO & HÖLZLE, supra note 22, at 1 (“Increasingly, computing and storage are moving
from PC-like clients to large Internet services.”).
24
See id. (“While early Internet services were mostly informational, today many Web
applications offer services that previously resided in the client, including email, photo and video
storage and office applications.”).
25
See id. (“The shift toward server-side computing is driven primarily not only by the need for
user experience improvements, such as ease of management (no configuration or backups needed) and
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storage will, of course, require the creation of a greater number of large
server farms.26
B. The Problem with Server Farms
Server farms can be big, hot, power-guzzling, and ugly.27 Google’s
Dalles Data Center will have a 75,000 square foot capacity.28 Microsoft’s
San Antonio Data Center is 475,000 square feet,29 and Apple’s new data
center in North Carolina is over 500,000 square feet.30 These examples
present the tip of the iceberg. Google has nineteen data centers in the
United States, twelve in Europe, three in Asia, and one in South America.31
In 2008, Microsoft was adding 10,000 servers a month.32
Location is important to providing good service. Long distances
between servers, as well as between servers and individual users, slow
delivery times.33 Unacceptable delivery times could kill the cloud
computing concept; therefore, there is a need for server farms based
broadly around the world.
Running a data center requires cheap energy—and a lot of it.34 A large
server farm can actually use as much power as a mid-sized city.35
ubiquity of access (a browser is all you need), but also by the advantages it offers to vendors.”).
26
Apple has apparently recognized the need for such large server farms. It is investing $1 billion
in a server farm in North Carolina. Erik Sherman, It’s Official: Apple To Build Massive Data Center,
BNET (June 3, 2009), http://industry.bnet.com/technology/10002016/its-official-apple-to-buildmassive-data-center/948 (reporting on North Carolina legislature’s passage of tax relief measure to
encourage Apple to build its facility in North Carolina). Google has similarly received state support for
the location of a server farm in North Carolina. Id.
27
See Stephanie N. Mehta, Behold the Server Farm, FORTUNE (July 28, 2006, 7:26 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2006/07/26/magazines/fortune/futureoftech_serverfarm.fortune/index.htm
(describing the growth of large server farms).
28
Matthew Wheeland, Google Data Center’s Massive Energy Appetite, GREENBIZ.COM (May 4,
2009, 3:50 PM), http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2009/05/04/google-data-centers-massive-energyappetite (describing energy use at a Google facility).
29
J. Nicholas Hoover, Inside Microsoft’s $550 Million Mega Data Centers, INFORMATIONWEEK
(June 17, 2008), http://www.informationweek.com/news/hardware/data_centers/showArticle.jhtml?
articleID=208403723 (describing Microsoft’s San Antonio Data Center).
30
Rich Miller, First Look: Apple’s Massive iDataCenter, DATA CENTER KNOWLEDGE (Feb.
22,
2010),
http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2010/02/22/first-look-apples-massiveidatacenter.
31
Map of All Google Data Center Locations, ROYAL PINGDOM (Apr. 11,
2008), http://royal.pingdom.com/2008/04/11.
32
Ina Fried, Microsoft’s Data Centers Growing by the Truckload, CNET NEWS (Aug. 20, 2008,
7:28 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13860_3-10020902-56.html (outlining Microsoft’s server
growth).
33
Server Farms Becoming a Cash Crop, supra note 22.
34
See Cliff Kuang, Google To Take Its Servers to the High Seas?, FAST COMPANY (May 1, 2009),
http://www.fastcompany.com/blog/cliff-kuang/design-innovation/google-might-be-taking-its-servershigh-seas (explaining Google’s floating data center patent).
35
See Rachel Konrad, Server Farms on Hot Seat Amid Power Woes, CNET NEWS (May 14, 2001,
11:20 AM), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1017-257567.html (describing a server farm that would
consume the same amount of energy as that needed to provide energy for all the homes in the city of
Honolulu); Mehta, supra note 27 (discussing the immense amount of energy needed to construct a data
center).
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Understandably, many current farms are in areas that provide relatively
inexpensive power.36 If low-cost energy is not readily available, the server
farm may need to build power sub-stations.37 Although attempts have been
made to make servers greener,38 power consumption remains a major
concern. Server farms produce a great deal of heat.39 Half of a typical data
center’s energy consumption is used for cooling.40 Thus, developers try to
locate server farms near rivers or lakes that can provide cooling for the
facility at a relatively low cost.41
Despite their overbearing size and power needs, Internet data centers
still serve a crucial function in the development of cyberspace. To the
extent that the server ship concept may offer an alternative that is greener
and more cost-effective, the development of such vessels could be a
godsend for the industry.
C. The Google Patent
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office granted Google’s patent on a
water-based data center on April 28, 2009.42 The data center would be
made up of servers inside containers like those normally used for the
carriage of goods by sea or rail.43 Cranes would place these containers on
ships or barges. The containers would be linked together to form large
data centers that would be located at sea wherever necessary.44 Ocean
waves, tides, or currents would supply power to these floating data

36
See Server Farms Becoming a Cash Crop, supra note 22 (stating that Google has built server
farms in “cheap-electricity locales”).
37
See, e.g., Rich Miller, RagingWire Builds Own Power Substation, DATA CENTER KNOWLEDGE
(Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2007/01/29/ragingwire-builds-ownpower-substation (discussing the construction of a hosting company’s own power substation). Google
has even received permission from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to act as a utility in
buying and selling power. Darren Murph, Google Gains Clearance To Buy and Sell Energy, Continue
Taking over the World, ENGADGET (Feb. 19, 2010, 8:02 PM), http://www.engadget.com/
2010/02/19/google-gains-clearance-to-buy-and-sell-energy-continue-taking-o.
38
For an entire website about green data centers, see GREEN DATA CENTER NEWS,
http://www.greendatacenternews.org (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
39
Jane Anne Morris, The Energy Nightmare of Web Server Farms, SYNTHESIS/REGENERATION,
Winter 2008, at 6, 6, available at http://www.greens.org/s-r/45/45-03.html.
40
Id.
41
See Mehta, supra note 27 (discussing how Microsoft began constructing a server farm close to
hydroelectric power); Server Farms Becoming a Cash Crop, supra note 22 (“[S]erver farms typically
require a good water source because the outposts often use water-cooled systems . . . rather than
conventional air-conditioning.”).
42
Water-Based Data Ctr., U.S. Patent No. 7,525,207 (filed Feb. 26, 2007) (issued Apr. 28, 2009).
43
Id. at col. 3 ll. 13–23.
44
Id. at col. 3 ll. 11–29. The patent also purports to cover data centers on land that are powered
and cooled in the same fashion. Id. at col. 9 ll. 58–64.
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centers, and pumping the surrounding water through an onboard system
would cool them.46
Figure 1
Illustration from Google patent of ship with server containers on board,
Pelamis machines providing power, and cooling provided by the water47

In the patent application, Google noted the increasing need for global
access to the Internet, with ever-expanding bandwidth expectations.48 This
additional demand fed the need for localized data centers; after all, running
long-distance connections to remotely-located server farms would be
prohibitively costly, inefficient, and unworkable.49 In addition, Google
noted that emergencies or military exercises could require establishing a
45

Id. at col. 1 ll. 57–65. As an example, Google suggests that Pelamis machines could provide
power. Id. at col. 2 ll. 13–25. These devices use wave energy to create electricity. For more
information, see the Pelamis Wave Power corporate website, http://www.pelamiswave.com (last visited
Jan. 15, 2011).
46
‘207 Patent at col. 2 ll. 1–6.
47
Id. at fig.1B.
48
Id. at col. 1 ll. 10–14.
49
Id. at col. 1 ll. 24–30. Google explains that it is best to locate these servers close to users.
When this is done, data must only be sent once and network activity is limited and balanced. Id. at col.
1 ll. 31–38.
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data center in a location that lacks adequate land-based facilities.
Thus, Google’s application emphasized cost, efficiency, and
environmental friendliness as the reasons driving the need for water-based
data centers.51 Some have suggested other motivations, however, such as
the creation of data centers outside the jurisdictions of the countries that
they serve.52 Google might do this to avoid, for example, China’s
restrictions on search results leading to websites considered unacceptable
to China’s ruling elite. On the other hand, Google might be trying to create
data centers storing sensitive materials to escape local laws, like The Pirate
Bay’s attempt to use Sealand. Roving server farms might also provide a
desirable venue for typically heavily regulated industries, such as banking
and credit card operations that want to escape local laws, including
taxation. Gambling or pornography websites could also escape scrutiny by
running floating sites. These purported freedoms would inescapably
generate national jurisdictional claims with serious international legal and
political implications.
A website owner could theoretically be located anywhere in the world.
For any number of reasons, a national government might want to eliminate
access to that website within its national boundaries or at least control the
allowed content. Australia may want to allow its nationals to bring a libel
suit in its courts regarding statements made on a U.S. website read in
Australia.53 France will prohibit Nazi memorabilia being sold on a Yahoo!
auction site from appearing in France.54 China wants to tightly control any
content critical of the government or its policies.55 In fact, Google is
currently struggling to comply with Chinese law.56 Effectively exercising
jurisdiction over a website located halfway around the world is difficult.
50

Id. at col. 1 ll. 40–50.
See id. at col. 1 ll. 10–50 (describing the advantages of a water-based data center).
See Annalee Newitz, Server Farms of the High Seas, IO9 (Sept. 8, 2008),
http://io9.com/5047017/server-farms-of-the-high-seas (questioning Google’s motives for the patent).
53
See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD 147–48 (2006) (discussing an Australian case against the Wall Street Journal for
alleged defamatory information on its website).
54
See id. at 1–8 (discussing a French suit against Yahoo! to have Nazi items removed from its
auction sites); see also Jennifer Shyu, Comment, Speak No Evil: Circumventing Chinese Censorship,
45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211, 239–40, 247 (2008) (suggesting that proxy-blocking services and
economic coercion would provide a temporary remedy for Chinese censorship).
55
See Charles Li, Internet Content Control in China, INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y, Winter
2003/2004, at 1, 5 (discussing Chinese attempts at Internet control).
56
See Keith B. Richburg, China Renews Google’s License; Globe’s Biggest Online Market,
WASH. POST, July 10, 2010, at A08 (reporting that Google’s discontinuance of its policy rerouting
Chinese users to its Hong King site caused renewal of license to operate in China); Thomas Claburn,
Google China Shutdown Almost Certain, INFO. WEEK (Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.information
week.com/news/software/open_source/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=223800260 (reporting that Google
may shut down its operations in China because it has been unable to reach agreement with China
regarding its censorship rules); Lara Farrar, Google-China Move Hurts Businesses, Academics, CNN
(Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/BUSINESS/03/23/china.google.impact/index.html
(discussing the ramifications of Google’s departure from China).
51
52
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That does not mean, however, that there is no way for a nation to
control access to unwanted materials on the Internet. One option would be
to regulate the local user, but this piecemeal approach is likely to prove
unwieldy, ineffective, and expensive.57 Going after individuals among
millions of users does little to stop the overall flow of information. Users
are likely to rely on the statistical unlikelihood of being the targeted user.
The use of libraries or Internet cafes also makes it more difficult to identify
the real user. A state may better be able to control Internet content by
going after what Professors Goldsmith and Wu refer to as “Internet
intermediaries.”58 Intermediaries could include Internet service providers,
search engines, entities providing financial services, or domain name
registry providers, and any state could go after any of these entities with
personnel or property within its borders.59 Exercising control over a search
engine provider could be a particularly effective way of restricting
information access because the search engine is critical to deciphering the
Internet’s enormous content. Although it is probably impossible to remove
all intermediaries from the local jurisdiction, one key link of the Internet
chain could perhaps escape the state’s reach by moving offshore.
Relocating the search engine to the open water could remove it from the
state’s jurisdiction. Because Google’s patent presumes the sea as a base
for its activities, international law in general and the UNCLOS in particular
provide the basic international law framework necessary to analyze
possible jurisdiction over the server farms and other offshore activities.
III. GENERAL NOTIONS OF JURISDICTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Ignoring for the moment that these data ships will be located on the
seas, a review of international norms for the exercise of prescriptive
jurisdiction should help focus the discussion. In the Case of the S.S. Lotus,
the Permanent Court of International Justice laid out the general principle
for a state’s assertion of jurisdiction:
Though it is true that in all systems of law the principle
of the territorial character of criminal law is fundamental, it is
equally true that all or nearly all these systems of law extend
their action to offences committed outside the territory of the
State which adopts them, and they do so in ways which vary
from State to State. The territoriality of criminal law,
therefore, is not an absolute principle of international law and
57
See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 53, at 70 (describing the difficulties that arise in Internet
regulation when governments attempt to circumvent intermediaries such as Internet Service Providers).
58
Goldsmith and Wu define these intermediaries as “the people, equipment, and services within
national borders that enable local Internet users to consume the offending Internet communication.” Id.
at 68.
59
Id. at 72–79.
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by no means coincides with territorial sovereignty.

Thus, the state is not limited to its territorial boundaries in applying its
laws internationally. Nevertheless, boundaries do constrain how far a state
can go, and these limits relate to the three primary types of jurisdiction.61
Prescriptive jurisdiction provides the extent to which a state may make
legal rules applicable to persons or activities.62 Adjudicative jurisdiction
concerns the power of the state to force persons or property in its courts or
other tribunals.63 Enforcement jurisdiction governs when a state may
require compliance with its laws.64 This Article focuses on prescriptive
and enforcement jurisdiction, which would be the primary focus of
international concerns over a state’s attempt to exert authority over any
new technology on the seas.
According to the Restatement of the Law (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States (“Restatement (Third)”), international
law allows the state prescriptive jurisdiction over:
(1)(a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes
place within its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present
within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to
have substantial effect within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its
nationals outside as well as within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its
nationals that is directed against the security of the state or
against a limited class of other state interests.65
The Restatement (Third) further limits the exercise of jurisdiction by
requiring that it be reasonable in light of international comity concerns.66
60
61

The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 20 (Sept. 7).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401

(1987).
62

Id. § 401(a).
Id. § 401(b).
64
Id. § 401(c).
65
Id. § 402; Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP.
439, 439–40 (1935).
66
The Restatement (Third) provides:
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state
may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity
having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is
unreasonable.
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is
determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to
63
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In addition to these foundational principles of jurisdiction, any state may
prescribe activities considered to be universal crimes, such as piracy, slave
trade, aircraft attack or hijacking, genocide, war crimes, and certain
specified acts of terrorism.67 The question is whether these general
jurisdictional principles could support a state’s jurisdiction to prescribe the
conduct of a server ship outside its territorial jurisdiction.
A. Territorial
A state unquestionably possesses the right to exercise prescriptive
jurisdiction over persons, locations, or activities within its territory.68 No
sensible data center wishing to avoid the exercise of a particular state’s
jurisdiction to prescribe would locate within the state’s territorial
boundaries. The remaining and related inquiry, however, is whether
territorial jurisdiction might provide a basis for jurisdiction that reaches an
outside-the-state server that connects with local computers inside the
state’s territories. In other areas, states have utilized the objective
territorial principle to exercise jurisdiction over activities that occur outside
the jurisdiction, so long as effects are felt within the state.69 The presence
which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between
the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be
regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to
protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to
the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the
degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise
jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are in
conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other state’s
interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors, Subsection (2);
a state should defer to the other state if that state’s interest is clearly greater.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (1987).
67
Id. § 404 (allowing states to define and punish certain universal crimes).
68
See Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (finding that territorial
jurisdiction is exclusive and absolute); see also Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 694 (2008) (reiterating
the Schooner Exchange language).
69
For example, the United States has a long history of exercising antitrust jurisdiction over
extraterritorial acts having effects in the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443–44 (2d Cir. 1945). For attempts to recognize international comity concerns to
prevent overreaching by U.S. courts, see F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155,
165–66 (2004); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297–98 (3d Cir. 1979);

722

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:709

of a floating data center outside state territorial jurisdiction that allows a
local to gamble or set up an offshore banking account may well create
“effects” that could form the basis for prescriptive jurisdiction. Even the
ability to search for a site that offends the laws of the state could be seen as
producing effects. Under the Restatement (Third) standard, the server
ship’s conduct could be considered to have or be intended to have,
substantial effects within its territory.70
B. Nationality
International law also allows states to prescribe the behavior of their
nationals.71 Nationals are considered to owe an allegiance to their home
country—and the state similarly retains an interest in its nationals—no
matter where the national travels.72 In addition, a state is thought to be
responsible internationally for its citizens’ actions, making worldwide
jurisdiction appropriate.73 Thus, the United States criminalizes its citizens’
bribery of a foreign official anywhere on the globe.74
Any state could pass laws applicable to nationals on board a domestic
or foreign flag vessel ship.75 In addition, the coastal state could enact
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 607 (9th Cir. 1976). But see Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798–99 (1993) (refusing to apply comity doctrine absent a true conflict
between U.S. and foreign law). See also Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of
U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 6–21 (1992) (discussing the rules of statutory construction
which allow federal courts to “establish the extraterritorial reach of federal law”); Steven R. Swanson,
A Threshold Test for Validity: The Supreme Court Narrows the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 889, 908–15 (1991) (commenting on the diminishing role of international comity via
limitations on the “act of state doctrine”). The extent to which the European Court of Justice has
adopted a form of the effects test has been a matter of some dispute. See Joseph P. Griffin, EC and
U.S. Extraterrritoriality: Activism and Cooperation, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 353, 355–59 (1994)
(analyzing developments in extraterritorial jurisprudence).
In the context of the law of the sea, the S.S. Lotus case stated:
If, therefore, a guilty act committed on the high seas produces its effects on a vessel
flying another flag or in foreign territory, the same principles must be applied as if
the territories of two different States were concerned, and the conclusion must
therefore be drawn that there is no rule of international law prohibiting the State to
which the ship on which the effects of the offence have taken place belongs, from
regarding the offence as having been committed in its territory and prosecuting,
accordingly, the delinquent.
The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 25 (Sept. 7).
70
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(2)(a)
(1987).
71
See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436–37 (1932) (requiring a U.S. citizen residing
in France to return to the United States to give testimony in a tax case).
72
See Geoffrey R. Watson, Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal
Jurisdiction, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 41, 67–70 (1992) (“In civil law and common law systems alike,
nationality jurisdiction is normally justified by the theory that the national owes allegiance to the home
state both while at home and while abroad.”).
73
Id. at 68.
74
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(dd)(1)–(3), (ff) (2006).
75
See Horace B. Robertson, Jr., The Suppression of Pirate Radio Broadcasting: A Test Case of
the International System for Control of Activities Outside National Territory, 45 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 71, 88 (1982) (“Where a person, corporation, vessel or aircraft has the nationality of a state,
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legislation prohibiting its nationals from dealing with an offending
vessel.76 These laws could attempt to regulate activities on the server ship
in any number of ways.77 Of course, a vessel itself is considered to have
the nationality of its flag jurisdiction, and the flag state may regulate its
conduct anywhere in the world.78
C. Protective
The Restatement (Third) indicates that a state may exercise jurisdiction
under the protective principle.79 Although the extent of coverage has not
always been clear, comment f attempts to define its parameters:
f. The protective principle. . . . International law
recognizes the right of a state to punish a limited class of
offenses committed outside its territory by persons who are
not its nationals—offenses directed against the security of the
state or other offenses threatening the integrity of
governmental functions that are generally recognized as
crimes by developed legal systems, e.g., espionage,
counterfeiting of the state’s seal or currency, falsification of
official documents, as well as perjury before consular
officials, and conspiracy to violate the immigration or
customs laws.80
Whether this provision would apply to a server ship would depend on
what the vessel was doing. The United States has used the principle to
outlaw perjury committed before a government official abroad,81 to apply a
statute extraterritorially that criminalized violent crimes in aid of
racketeering,82 and to allow the boarding of vessels suspected of smuggling
drugs without seeking the flag state’s permission.83 In addition, the
protective principle has been used to justify environmental and antiterrorism legislation.84 If a server farm’s main purpose is to facilitate filesharing or Internet searches, it is unlikely that its activities would be
that state has jurisdiction to make rules governing the conduct of that person, corporation, vessel or
aircraft.”).
76
Id.
77
See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
78
See infra notes 161–62 and accompanying text.
79
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(3)
(1987).
80
Id. § 402 cmt. f.
81
See United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 9 (2d Cir. 1968).
82
See United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 837 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying 18 U.S.C. §
1959 (2006) to the kidnapping and murder of a Drug Enforcement Agency agent).
83
See United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 933–34 (11th Cir. 1985).
84
See MARIA GAVOUNELI, FUNCTIONAL JURISDICTION IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 31–32 (2007)
(discussing how the protective principle establishes “the acknowledged basis of anti-terrorist
protection”).
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considered threatening to state security. On the other hand, a server ship
providing banking services that facilitate tax avoidance or containing
sensitive national security information may implicate these sovereign
national interests. Protective jurisdiction might justify governmental acts
to pursue pirate radio broadcasters because controlling the radio airwaves
is considered an exclusively governmental function in European
countries.85 This same exclusivity cannot likely be claimed for the Internet
in general, a relatively unregulated wild west.86 Nevertheless, it is not
difficult to imagine circumstances under which the regulation of
extraterritorial servers might find justification under this principle.
D. Universal and Passive Personality
Any state has the power to prescribe a relatively limited group of
offenses that are considered by the international community to be of
universal concern.87 Initially, covered crimes were limited to piracy and
slave trading; over time, coverage expanded to include various acts of
hijacking and terrorism, genocide, and some war crimes.88 Unless the
server ship is involved in one of these prohibited activities, universal
jurisdiction will not apply.
Passive personality is a more controversial principle that supports state
attempts to prescribe conduct that harms its nationals.89 Under this
approach, the United States criminalizes taking U.S. citizens hostage
outside the country90 and terrorist murders of U.S. citizens abroad.91
Generally, passive personality does not reach ordinary crimes or civil
wrongs; rather, the doctrine is triggered by public wrongs such as terrorist
attacks or crimes against diplomatic representatives.92 Although it is
possible to imagine a scenario in which a server farm could be utilized for
serious misconduct of this sort, the principle’s real-world relevance in this
context seems strained.
In the end, even if a traditional basis of prescriptive jurisdiction
applies, the power to enforce that prescription may be far more
challenging. The UNCLOS provides the steps that the coastal state can

85

Robertson, supra note 75, at 87.
Although the content of the Internet has been left primarily to its users, the United States has
tried to maintain control over the Internet root authority. For an interesting story of failed attempts to
remove this control, see GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 53, at 29–46.
87
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404
(1987).
88
Id. § 404 & 404 cmt. a.
89
Id. § 402 cmt. g.
90
18 U.S.C. § 1203 (2006).
91
Id. § 2332.
92
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 cmt. g
(1987).
86
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take against a vessel on the seas. The coastal state’s inability to enforce
its prescriptions may undo any national laws regulating the server ship.
IV. THE LAW OF THE SEA
The international law of the sea, as it exists today, is the product of a
constant battle between freedom of the seas and state assertions of control
over those waters.94 Although recognized as early as the Roman Civil
Law,95 the freedom of the seas argument finds its intellectual origins in the
writings of Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius in his Mare Liberum,96 which was
published in 1608.97 The work grew out of a dispute over Portugal’s claim
to exclusive trade with the East Indies.98 Grotius used natural law theory
to argue that the sea is a common conduit for trade and communication
among states and not subject to taking by the state for its own use.99
Because no state can control something as vast as the oceans, a state’s
jurisdiction should be limited to the area that it can control effectively.100
93

UNCLOS, supra note 15, at arts. 21, 25, 27, 28, 33, 56, 73, 77, 105, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111.
D.P. O’CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 1 (1982). O’Connell argues that the
balance between these themes has changed with the times:
The tension between these has waxed and waned through the centuries, and has
reflected the political, strategic, and economic circumstances of each particular age.
When one or two great commercial powers have been dominant or have achieved
parity of power, the emphasis in practice has lain upon the liberty of navigation and
the immunity of shipping from local control; in such ages the seas have been viewed
more as strategic than as economic areas of competition. When, on the other hand,
great powers have been in decline or have been unable to impose their wills on
smaller States, or when an equilibrium of power has been attained between a
multiplicity of States, the emphasis has lain on the protection and reservation of
maritime resources, and consequently upon the assertion of local authority over the
sea.
Id.
95
Patrick W. Franzese, Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Can It Exist?, 64 A.F. L. REV. 1, 7, 18 (2009)
(arguing for the extension of state sovereignty in cyberspace). For a detailed discussion of the history
of high seas freedoms, see generally PITMAN B. POTTER, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS IN HISTORY,
LAW, AND POLITICS (1924).
96
HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREE SEA (Richard Haklyut trans., Liberty Fund 2004) (1608). For an
online English translation of this famous work, see HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
(Ralph van Deman Magoffin trans.) (1608), http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=
com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=552&Itemid=27 (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
97
O’CONNELL, supra note 94, at 10.
98
Id. at 9. Apparently, the dispute arose when a group of Dutch East India vessels captured a
Portuguese merchant vessel. Some saw the Dutch act as the equivalent of piracy, and Grotius was
asked to write a defense of the Dutch acts. He later edited his work, and Mare Liberum was published
as a pamphlet in 1608.
Freedom of the Seas, YALE L. LIBR.—RARE BOOKS BLOG,
http://blogs.law.yale.edu/blogs/rarebooks/archive/tags/Freedom+of+the+Seas+1609+exhibit/
default.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
99
See GEORGE V. GALDORISI & KEVIN R. VIENNA, BEYOND THE LAW OF THE SEA: NEW
DIRECTIONS FOR U.S. OCEANS POLICY 10 (1997) (“[N]o part of the sea can be considered as territory
of any people whatsoever.”); O’CONNELL, supra note 94, at 9–10 (describing the “theory that the seas
are avenues of commerce which of their nature are not susceptible of appropriation”).
100
See GROTIUS, supra note 96, at 26–27 (providing a description of the sea as common
property).
94
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In response, English jurist John Selden published Mare Clausum in
1635.101 Selden conceded that the earth had, at one point, been subject to
common holding, but argued that God had allowed the division of the
oceans and that man had accepted that separation through the social
contract.102 He denied Grotius’s argument that the seas were too vast to
control, saying that the oceans were as subject to delimitation as the land
because the ocean resources were not without limits.103 According to
Selden, by exercising dominion over the sea, the possessor may exclude all
others.104
In the end, Grotius’s free seas approach won out, mostly because the
colonial powers needed unrestricted commerce with their far-reaching
holdings.105 Coastal state jurisdiction was restricted to a thin band along
the coastline, purportedly the distance that cannons could fire.106 The
three-mile limit remained the rule until the middle of the twentieth century,
when states sought greater control over maritime resources.107
This push for greater state control over the oceans can be seen in the
UNCLOS,108 which divides the seas into a number of different zones with
101

O’CONNELL, supra note 94, at 11 & n.61.
Id. at 11.
103
See POTTER, supra note 95, at 77 (supporting Selden’s conclusion that the “sea could be
bounded as well as the land”).
104
See id. at 72–73 (stating that, in Selden’s view, dominion over the sea is “a full title”).
105
GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 99, at 10.
106
Id.
107
Id. The law of the sea continues to exhibit the tension between mare liberum and mare
clausum. The United States, as a major naval power and supporter of free trade, has long supported the
freedom of the seas argument:
The right to send ships across the oceans unimpeded by other states, subject only to
limited exceptions in a coastal state’s maritime zones and even more limited
exceptions on the high seas, has long been a centerpiece of U.S. policy. The United
States has been concerned for centuries with keeping the oceans open for trade and
commerce. Even before the United States was formed, American colonists stressed
the importance of free navigation. The United States, responding to attacks on
commercial vessels, sent a permanent naval squadron to the Mediterranean in 1815
to suppress pirates. Furthermore, the United States has often emphasized the
importance of international law in protecting neutral shipping during wartime.
According to Professor Douglas Sylvester, the United States historically promoted
“[n]eutrality, recast as a right of sovereignty under the law of nations, [as] the
cornerstone of the system” of international commerce, a system to which the United
States maintained an “ideological commitment.” Preserving navigational freedoms
was a major reason for U.S. participation in the War of 1812 and World War I. As
the U.S. Supreme Court said in 1947, the United States “throughout its existence has
stood for freedom of the seas.”
John E. Noyes, The United States, the Law of the Sea Convention, and Freedom of Navigation, 29
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 11 (2005) (quoting Douglas J. Sylvester, International Law as Sword
or Shield? Early American Foreign Policy and the Law of Nations, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 86
(1999)).
108
See ARND BERNAERTS, BERNAERTS’ GUIDE TO THE 1982 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA 102–03 (1988) (describing states’ interests in the UNCLOS); Bernard H. Oxman,
The Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 830, 833–36 (2006) (discussing
how the UNCLOS addresses the temptation to assign geographic boundaries and territories to the sea).
102
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varying legal regimes. In addition, the UNCLOS recognizes different
actors with roles in this legal regime; the relevant primary actors are the
flag state and the coastal state.109 International legal rules controlling a
data center vessel’s actions on the seas will differ depending on the ship’s
location and who is attempting to exercise jurisdiction. For purposes of
this discussion, one must assume that server ships could be found in any
zone at various times, making it necessary to look at the legal regimes
applying in each.
A. In the Zone
Under the UNCLOS, the coastal state’s ability to enforce its laws on a
foreign-flagged vessel depends on that vessel’s location. The UNCLOS
divides the seas into six zones: the internal waters, territorial seas,
contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, continental shelf, and high
seas.110 A different legal regime would apply to a server vessel in each of
these zones.
1. Internal Waters
The UNCLOS provides only limited coverage to the internal waters
inside the baselines drawn in accordance with the convention. In the case
of a relatively straight coast, the baseline is drawn on the low-water line of
the coast.111 Where the coast is irregular, a baseline will be constructed
using straight lines to join points along the coastline.112 These baselines
are not allowed to diverge significantly from the “general direction of the
coast,” and the waters inside the baselines must be “closely linked to the
land domain.”113 The internal waters of the coastal state are those on the
landward side of this baseline.114 These waters would include any portion
of the sea, as well as lakes, rivers, and bays within the line. For the
exercise of jurisdiction, a nation has full territorial sovereignty over
internal waters.115 In general, a server ship within a nation’s territorial
sovereignty will be subject to that nation’s jurisdiction, both in terms of
that country’s jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce its laws.116 The
109

See UNCLOS, supra note 15, at arts. 2, 94 (describing the sovereignty and duties of coastal
states and flag states, respectively).
110
DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 120 (2001).
111
UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 5.
112
Id. at art. 7(1).
113
Id. at art. 7(3).
114
Id. at art. 8(1).
115
BEDERMAN, supra note 110, at 120–21.
116
See Wildenhus’s Case, 120 U.S. 1, 19 (1886) (holding that every state has sovereign
jurisdiction throughout its territory and has an interest in repressing crimes and offences within its
territory); see also J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 223 (1963) (“A private ship in internal waters
is, in principle, fully subject to the local jurisdiction, and the completeness of the coastal state’s right to
exercise its jurisdiction in civil matters does not appear to be questioned.”).
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UNCLOS contains one exception to this exclusive coastal state
jurisdiction: where the application of straight baselines results in creating
internal waters that were traditionally not considered internal, the right of
innocent passage will apply.117
International law does not require that foreign vessels be allowed in
internal waters.118 Nevertheless, international ports are usually considered
open to merchant vessels during times of peace.119 When a foreign vessel
is in a coastal state port, both the flag state and the coastal state may claim
competence to control behavior on the vessel. Coastal states normally
refrain from exercising jurisdiction over matters having to do with the
vessel’s internal workings120 unless the infraction disturbs the peace and
tranquility of the port.121
In all likelihood, a coastal state’s attempt to regulate the server ship
would not relate solely to the vessel’s internal workings; as a result, the
server ship faces the real probability of subjecting its primary function to
local regulation. Of course, this presumes a workable definition of internal
workings, a concept that is less than clear.122 A vessel wishing to avoid
state jurisdiction will want to steer clear of the internal waters.
2. Territorial Seas
Although the law of the sea traditionally limited the state’s territorial
jurisdiction to the distance that a cannon could fire—later defined as three
nautical miles,123 the UNCLOS expanded the territorial seas to twelve
miles from the baselines,124 and coastal states generally have sovereign
rights over this area.125 The convention does, however, provide for the
right of innocent passage,126 which allows ships continuous and

117
UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 8(2). For a discussion of innocent passage, see infra notes
126–37 and accompanying text.
118
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14, 111 (June 27) (stating that internal waters are “subject to the sovereignty of the coastal State”);
LORI DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 1382 (5th ed. 2009).
119
See BEDERMAN, supra note 110, at 121; DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 118, at 1382 .
120
See Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 130 (2005) (“This Court has long
held that general statutes are presumed to apply to conduct that takes place aboard a foreign-flag vessel
in United States territory if the interests of the United States or its citizens, rather than interests internal
to the ship, are at stake.”); Wildenhus, 120 U.S. at 12 (“[I]t would be beneficial to commerce if the
local government would abstain from interfering with the internal discipline of the ship . . . .”).
121
Wildenhus, 120 U.S. at 17.
122
See Spector, 545 U.S. at 130 (discussing the conditions under which U.S. statutes apply to
foreign-flag ships, a consideration that turns on whether the statute would regulate “the internal order
and discipline of the vessel”).
123
BERNAERTS, supra note 108, at 112.
124
UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 3.
125
Id. at art. 2(1).
126
Article 17 of the UNCLOS provides for innocent passage: “Subject to this Convention, ships
of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial
sea.” Id. at art. 17.
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expeditious passage through the coastal state’s territorial seas, so long as
that passage is innocent.128 Passage is generally deemed innocent if it does
not interfere with the “peace, good order or security of the coastal State.”129
The UNCLOS lists activities that are not innocent.130 Most would be
of little concern to the server ship, but a few could be construed as
applying. Article 19(2)(c) states that “any act aimed at collecting
information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal State”
is not innocent.131 Assuming that the data vessel limits itself to storing and
transmitting information, it would be difficult to show that it is collecting
information.132 Article 19(2)(d) could be more problematic; it provides
that “any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of
127

Ships are allowed passage through the territorial sea under UNCLOS article 18:
1. Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of:
(a) traversing that sea without entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead
or port facility outside internal waters; or
(b) proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such roadstead or port
facility.
2. Passage shall be continuous and expeditious. However, passage includes
stopping and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary
navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure or distress or for the purpose
of rendering assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in danger or distress.
Id. at art. 18
128
UNCLOS article 19 defines what is considered innocent:
1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or
security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with this
Convention and with other rules of international law.
2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace,
good order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of
the following activities:
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of
the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or
security of the coastal State;
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the
coastal State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to
the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal
State;
(h) any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention;
(i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any
other facilities or installations of the coastal State;
(l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.
Id. at art. 19.
129
Id. at art. 19(1)
130
Id. at art. 19(2)(a)–(l).
131
Id. at art. 19(2)(c).
132
Article 19(2)(j) also states that research and survey activities are not innocent. The server
vessel would not be likely to undertake such efforts. Id. at art. 19(2).
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133

the coastal State” would not be innocent.
Information stored on and
transmitted by the server ship could arguably constitute such propaganda.
Article 19(2)(k) also presumes non-innocence for “any act aimed at
interfering with any systems of communication or any other facilities or
installations of the coastal State.”134 If a server hooks into the coastal
state’s Internet, could that act amount to interference with that state’s
systems of communication? Although it seems likely that this provision
was aimed at pirate radio or jamming devices, a state might argue that
certain information or technology relating to the data ship could interfere
with its system of communication. For example, hackers might attack
through the server ship. If the state attempts to filter certain information
from entering the country, the server ship might somehow interfere with
that effort. The UNCLOS drafters never had such scenarios in mind when
drafting the convention;135 even so, these circumstances could yield an
argument for interference with server ship activities. Finally, the
UNCLOS includes a catchall provision against “any other activity not
having a direct bearing on passage.”136 It is easy to imagine a state making
expansive arguments against innocence under this provision, and some
have.137
Of course, these innocence questions do not matter if the vessel is not
in passage mode, moving continuously and expeditiously through the
territorial waters.138 If either the transmission mode (cable or wireless) or
energy production system requires the vessel to be stationary, the
UNCLOS will likely not consider the ship’s travel through the territorial
seas as passage. The Google patent provides that the ship would be
anchored while operating;139 thus, its anchored server farm would likely
not be in passage.
133

Id. at art. 19(2)(d).
Id. at art. 19(2)(k).
135
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea met from 1973–82. The United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A Historical Perspective), OCEANS AND LAW OF THE SEA
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm
(last
visited Jan. 15, 2011). Although a rudimentary form of the Internet was initially brought online in
1969, its widespread use was not possible until the design of the World Wide Web in 1990 by Tim
Berners-Lee, long after the completion of the UNCLOS process. Walt Howe, A Brief History of the
Internet, WALTHOWE.COM, http://www.walthowe.com/navnet/history.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
136
UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 19(2)(l).
137
See GAVOUNELI, supra note 84, at 40 & n.60 (discussing expansive claims that environmental
protection justifies a claim that passage is not innocent).
138
It has been argued that ships cannot hover or cruise around the territorial sea, because,
regardless of whether or not they are innocent, they would not be engaged in passage. See R.R.
CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 82 (1983) (noting how “coastal State jurisdiction is
reserved in the case of ships lying in the territorial sea or passing through it after leaving internal
waters”). Nevertheless, ships may stop when there is a valid navigational reason to do so or required
by force majeure, distress, or saving life or property. UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 18(2).
139
Water-Based Data Ctr., U.S. Patent No. 7,525,207 col.1 ll. 57–62 (filed Feb. 26, 2007) (issued
Apr. 28, 2009).
134
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For the most part, a ship doing anything more than efficiently
transiting through the territorial sea should assume that it will be subject to
the coastal state’s full jurisdiction. If the server ship’s passage is noninnocent, the coastal state has full jurisdiction over the vessel140 and “may
take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not
innocent.”141 The convention does not clarify exactly what these steps
might be.142
3. Contiguous Zone
The UNCLOS codifies a contiguous zone outside the territorial sea
that extends twenty-four nautical miles from the baseline.143 Within this
zone, the coastal state can prevent or punish violations of its “customs,
fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or
territorial sea.”144 The convention notably does not permit a coastal state
to exercise jurisdiction in the contiguous zone for security violations.
Although the waters in this zone are considered part of the high seas, states
may still exercise limited jurisdiction.145 The data center vessel in the
contiguous zone should not risk interference unless its actions will have a
prohibited effect within the territory or territorial sea. The most likely
140

GAVOUNELI, supra note 84, at 40.
UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 25(1).
William K. Agyebeng, Theory in Search of Practice: The Right of Innocent Passage in the
Territorial Sea, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 371, 384 (2006) (arguing that freedom of navigation should
prevail over states’ claims for greater authority). Article 21 of the UNCLOS does put limits on the
types of restrictions that the coastal states can put on innocent passage:
1. The coastal State may adopt laws and regulations, in conformity with the
provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law, relating to
innocent passage through the territorial sea, in respect of all or any of the following:
(a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic;
(b) the protection of navigational aids and facilities and other facilities or
installations;
(c) the protection of cables and pipelines;
(d) the conservation of the living resources of the sea;
(e) the prevention of infringement of the fisheries laws and regulations of the
coastal State;
(f) the preservation of the environment of the coastal State and the prevention,
reduction and control of pollution thereof;
(g) marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys;
(h) the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigration or
sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State.
2. Such laws and regulations shall not apply to the design, construction, manning
or equipment of foreign ships unless they are giving effect to generally accepted
international rules or standards.
3. The coastal State shall give due publicity to all such laws and regulations.
4. Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage through the territorial
sea shall comply with all such laws and regulations and all generally accepted
international regulations relating to the prevention of collisions at sea.
UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 21.
143
UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 33(2).
144
Id. at art. 33(1)(a).
145
DAMROSCH, supra note 118, at 1403.
141
142
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danger would be violations of the state’s tax policy if the vessel is involved
in offshore banking or illegal gambling activities which have an effect in
the coastal state. In such cases, the ship should assume that the coastal
state would have jurisdiction over the vessel.
4. Exclusive Economic Zone
Because the Google patent includes an energy production component,
it could run afoul of UNCLOS provisions relating to the exclusive
economic zone (“EEZ”). The EEZ extends 200 nautical miles from the
coastal state’s baselines.146 These states have sovereign rights to exploit
natural resources in the EEZ,147 an area covering about one-third of the
world’s oceans.148 In particular, Article 56 states that the rights extend to
“activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such
as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds.”149
Although high seas freedoms are otherwise allowed in the EEZ, the coastal
state’s sovereign rights over energy production would likely trump the data
center ship’s need to manufacture its own electricity. The coastal state
could likely prevent the ship’s operation anywhere within the 200-mile
EEZ. On the other hand, if another method could be found for powering
the ship’s electronics, its actions would provoke no resource issue, and the
rules relating to the high seas would apply.
In addition, the UNCLOS provides that the coastal state has exclusive
rights to construct or authorize “installations and structures” for Article 56
purposes in the EEZ.150 A data ship permanently anchored to the ocean
146
147

UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 57.
Id. at art. 56. Article 56 outlines the rights, jurisdiction, and duties of the coastal State in the

EEZ:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters
superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to
other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as
the production of energy from the water, currents and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention
with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the
exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and
duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of
this Convention.
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the seabed and subsoil shall be
exercised in accordance with Part VI.
Id.

148

Oxman, supra note 108, at 839.
UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 56.
150
Id. at art. 60. Article 60 provides, in part:
149
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floor might be considered such a structure, making it subject to the coastal
state’s exclusive rights. Given the coastal state’s exclusive control over
energy production, it may not matter whether the anchored server ship is
an Article 56 installation or a ship exercising its high seas freedoms. In
either case, it would be subject to state regulation. Nevertheless, subject to
these restrictions, all vessels retain the high seas freedoms otherwise
provided for by the convention,151 including freedom of navigation.152
5. The Continental Shelf
The UNCLOS gives the coastal state sovereign rights over the
continental shelf “for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural
resources.”153 The server ship outlined in the Google patent should not
have any significant effect on these resources, making it unlikely that a
coastal state could use this regime to regulate such a vessel.
6. The High Seas
Assuming that the server ship is trying to avoid national jurisdiction,
its best bet is likely to operate on the high seas. Of course, doing this could
undercut one of the goals of putting the data center in the water. If the
vessel operates 200 miles off the coast, it loses some of the benefit of
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have the exclusive right
to construct and to authorize and regulate the construction, operation and use of:
(a) artificial islands;
(b) installations and structures for the purposes provided for in article 56 and
other economic purposes;
(c) installations and structures which may interfere with the exercise of the
rights of the coastal State in the zone.
2. The coastal State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such artificial islands,
installations and structures, including jurisdiction with regard to customs, fiscal,
health, safety and immigration laws and regulations.
Id.

151
152

Id.

Id. at art. 58.
Id. at art. 87. Article 87 provides:
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom
of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and
by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and landlocked States:
(a) freedom of navigation;
(b) freedom of overflight;
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI;
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under
international law, subject to Part VI;
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2;
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the
interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also
with due regard for the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the
Area.

153
Id. at art. 77. The UNCLOS contains a complicated set of rules for determining the extent of
the coastal state’s jurisdiction over the continental shelf. Id. at art. 76.
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transportability. The distance from ultimate users on land might become
problematic; obviously, closer is better. Even so, 200 miles is not a
terribly long distance, and a vessel seeking to avoid jurisdiction may find it
acceptable.
The high seas are not as vast as they once were. With the advent of a
broader territorial sea,154 expanded notions of jurisdiction in the contiguous
zone,155 extensions of sovereignty over economic resources in the EEZ156
and on the continental shelf,157 and additional rights for archipelagic
states,158 the remaining areas of high seas freedom have diminished.
Article 87 retains the primary high seas freedoms, particularly freedom of
navigation,159 and appears to provide no restrictions on the operation of a
server ship. Although the high seas legal regime is based on the ancient
notion of mare liberum,160 that has its limits. Article 87(2) requires that the
high seas freedoms be exercised with “with due regard for the interests of
other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas,”161 and
Article 88 limits free seas usage to “peaceful purposes.”162 One can
imagine a situation in which a data center vessel might be accused of
operating with less than peaceful purposes. In cases where the military is
using its resources to conduct operations or hack the national security
operations of the coastal state, there is no doubt that the server ship’s
activities would be considered less than peaceful. In most cases, however,
a server ship’s operation would seem to fit within the UNCLOS’s spirit
without violating its restrictions.163
In the S.S. Lotus case, the Permanent Court of International Justice
stated:
A corollary of the principle of the freedom of the seas is that
a ship on the high seas is assimilated to the territory of the
State the flag of which it flies, for, just as in its own territory,
that State exercises its authority upon it, and no other State
may do so.164

154

Id. at art. 3.
Id. at art. 33.
156
Id. at art. 56.
157
Id. at arts. 76–77.
158
Id. at arts. 46–54.
159
Id. at art. 87.
160
See The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1826) (stating that the seas are “[a]
common highway of all, appropriated to the use of all; and no one can vindicate to himself a superior or
exclusive prerogative there”).
161
UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 87(2).
162
Id. at art. 88.
163
See Robertson, supra note 75, at 79 (addressing the same issue with regard to the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82).
164
The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 25 (Sept. 7).
155
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Ships plying the high seas are expected to fly a national flag, and the
flag state generally exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the vessel.166
Under UNCLOS provisions, a server ship would have only one
nationality;167 ships attempting to fly the two or more flags are accorded
the same legal status as stateless vessels.168 If a ship appears to have no
nationality, the navy of any state may board and assert jurisdiction.169
Even when the vessel appropriately flies a flag, it may be boarded under
limited circumstances such as when the ship engages in piracy or the slave
trade, or illegally broadcasts into the coastal state.170 In addition,
customary international law allows public vessels to stop any ship that
constitutes a real threat to its national security or territorial integrity,
165

UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 91.
Article 92 provides:
1. Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases
expressly provided for in international treaties or in this Convention, shall be subject
to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas. A ship may not change its flag during a
voyage or while in a port of call, save in the case of a real transfer of ownership or
change of registry.
2. A ship which sails under the flags of two or more States, using them according
to convenience, may not claim any of the nationalities in question with respect to
any other State, and may be assimilated to a ship without nationality.
Id. at art. 92.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Article 110 of UNCLOS provides:
1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a
warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, other than a ship entitled
to complete immunity in accordance with articles 95 and 96, is not justified in
boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that:
(a) the ship is engaged in piracy;
(b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade;
(c) the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of the
warship has jurisdiction under article 109;
(d) the ship is without nationality; or
(e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in
reality, of the same nationality as the warship.
2. In the cases provided for in paragraph 1, the warship may proceed to verify the
ship’s right to fly its flag. To this end, it may send a boat under the command of an
officer to the suspected ship. If suspicion remains after the documents have been
checked, it may proceed to a further examination on board the ship, which must be
carried out with all possible consideration.
3. If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the ship boarded
has not committed any act justifying them, it shall be compensated for any loss or
damage that may have been sustained.
4. These provisions apply mutatis mutandis to military aircraft.
5. These provisions also apply to any other duly authorized ships or aircraft
clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service.
Id. at art. 110; see also United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1382–83 (11th Cir.
1982) (holding that any state may board a stateless vessel).
170
UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 110. For a full discussion of this issue, see Robert C.F.
Reuland, Note, Interference with Non-National Ships on the High Seas: Peacetime Exceptions to the
Exclusivity Rule of Flag-State Jurisdiction, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1161, 1229 (1989) (arguing
that the exceptions to flag-state jurisdiction are “small chinks” in the general rule of exclusive flag-state
jurisdiction).
166
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subject to the limits imposed by self-defense, necessity, and
proportionality.171
Having a nationality actually protects the ship from other states’
jurisdiction and lets the flag state exercise diplomatic protection over the
vessel under appropriate circumstances.172 Since random exercises of
jurisdiction would undercut any of the goals attributed to the Google
patent, the data center owner would be foolish not to seek flag state
protection for its server ships.
Because a server ship would need to have a nationality, it would likely
seek a flag that best suits its interests. Flag jurisdiction over shipping has
created controversies in diverse contexts.173 Seeking a loose regulatory
environment or lower taxes, ships seek registration in flag of convenience
countries,174 such as Liberia, Honduras, the Bahamas, St. Vincent & the
171

See Reuland, supra note 170, at 1206–10 (discussing the state’s right of self-defense on the
high seas).
172
H. MEYERS, THE NATIONALITY OF SHIPS 90 (1967); Robertson, supra note 75, at 80.
173
See BOLESLAW ADAM BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDY
1 (1962) (“This controversy [over flags of convenience] has assumed a variety of forms; there have
been strikes, boycotts, and picketing in ports all over the world—legal battles in municipal courts and
international assemblies—and even an appeal before the International Court of Justice in The Hague.”).
174
H. Edwin Anderson III provides a concise history and description of flags of convenience:
Historically, while vessels have been flagged or reflagged for one reason or
another, most scholars trace the modern use of flags of convenience to the 1920s, the
prohibition era of the United States. During that time, several U.S. vessels,
including two cruise liners, the M/V RELIANCE and the M/V RESOLUTE, were
reflagged in Panama to avoid the U.S. law banning the sale of alcohol aboard U.S.
ships.
Since the 1920s, the amount of the world’s tonnage flying flags of convenience
has steadily increased. The latest United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) “Review of Maritime Transport” listed the top three
shipowning nations as Greece (81.97 million dwt), Japan (80.3 million dwt), and the
United States (55.1 million dwt). Over half of the tonnage from these three nations
are flying flags of convenience. By all accounts, the trend in commercial shipping
to fly flags of convenience is still increasing.
The term “flag of convenience” has evolved to mean registration for primarily
economic reasons in a country with an open registry. Previously, the term
contemplated registration for political reasons or to conceal criminal or questionable
activities. Today, however, the term is used commonly in a pejorative sense and
indicates that a vessel owner, for one reason or another, does not want to create
mutual obligations with a country with stricter standards for registration. The
current perspective on the definition of “flags of convenience” was concisely
reflected in the Rochdale Report, published by the United Kingdom in 1970.
According to the Report, there are six criteria for determining the status of “flag of
convenience”:
“[1] The country of registry allows ownership and/or control of its merchant
vessels by non-citizens[;]
[2] Access to the registry is easy; ship may usually be registered at a consulate
abroad. Equally important, transfer from the registry at the owner’s option is not
restricted[;]
[3] Taxes on the income from the ships are not levied locally, or are very low. A
registry fee and an annual fee, based on tonnage, are normally the only charges
made. A guarantee or acceptable understanding regarding future freedom from
taxation may also be given[;]
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Grenadines, Belize, or Panama, even when there is no real relationship
between the vessel and the flag state.176
A server ship’s purpose will often dictate the chosen flag. If its goals
are limited to those usually faced by the shipping industry—low regulation
and cost—the server vessel may seek out one of the flag of convenience
nationalities. Other goals may suggest other possibilities. A flag of
convenience state may not have the power or political will to defend one of
these vessels against another state’s violations of the server vessel’s flag
state status. In light of these vulnerabilities, a major naval power such as
the United States offers more security as the flag nation.
On the other hand, if the server ship seeks to avoid a particular
country’s regulation, it will not want to fly that nation’s flag. For example,
a server ship trying to sidestep United States’ banking, gambling, or
pornography laws would not fly a U.S. flag. Another data center vessel
may want to protect information on board from political repression in a
particular country; for that reason, it will forego that country’s flag for one
with a strong tradition of allowing and protecting political speech. A
server vessel that wants to protect delicate information from the world will
want a state that champions the confidential nature of such information and
is willing to defend it. No one jurisdiction can be perfect under all
circumstances; thus, the server ship owner should consider different flags
for different vessels.
If server ships are registered in countries that meet the vessel’s needs,
will other states recognize those registrations? Although the UNCLOS
gives each state the right to determine its conditions for granting
nationality to a vessel,177 it also provides that the flag state must have a
[4] The country of registry is a small power with no national requirement under
any foreseeable circumstances for all the shipping registered, but receipts from very
small charges on a large tonnage may produce a substantial effect on its national
income and balance of payments[;]
[5] Manning of ships by non-nationals is freely permitted[; and]
[6] The country of registry has neither the power nor the administrative
machinery effectively to impose any governmental or international regulations; nor
has the country even the wish or the power to control the companies themselves.”
H. Edwin Anderson III, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: Economics, Politics, and
Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139, 156–58 (1996) (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (citing
Committee of Inquiry into Shipping: London, H.M.S.O. 1970, Cmnd 4337 [The Rochdale Report]).
175
David Garfield Wilson, Interdiction on the High Seas: The Role and Authority of a Master in
the Boarding and Searching of His Ship by Foreign Warships, 55 NAVAL L. REV. 157, 174–75 (2008).
176
BOCZEK, supra note 173, at 2.
177
Article 91 of the UNCLOS provides:
1. Every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for
the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have
the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a
genuine link between the State and the ship.
2. Every State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly its flag
documents to that effect.
UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 91; see also Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584 (1953) (“Each
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genuine link with the ship.
Can a state refuse to recognize the vessel’s
nationality when no genuine link exists? In the M/V Saiga case, the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea determined that the state
could not;179 after all, the genuine link provision only exists to ensure that
the flag state can exercise the UNCLOS-required control over the vessel.180
The 1986 United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of
Ships181 does little to clarify the situation. Although that convention does
better define what constitutes a genuine link, it lets the flag state determine
whether to grant nationality to a vessel.182 The treaty does not suggest that
another state can challenge the genuineness of the links; this limits its
relevance in this context. More importantly, the convention requires forty
ratifications to come into force;183 to date, only fourteen nations have
ratified.184
Thus, neither the UNCLOS nor the Convention on Conditions for
Registration of Ships prevents a data center ship from seeking a flag state
that meets its needs. Under current law, the best way to avoid interference
with the ship’s operations would be to find a friendly flag state and operate
on the high seas. That flag state should have exclusive jurisdiction over
the flag vessel and its activities, achieving the goal of removing the data
center from other nations’ prying eyes and restrictions.
B. Pirate Radio
In examining how the data center ship’s new technology might be
treated outside normal sovereign control, the analogous situations
state under international law may determine for itself the conditions on which it will grant its
nationality to a merchant ship . . . .”).
178
The concept of a genuine link comes from the Nottebohm case, in which the International
Court of Justice determined that a state need not recognize another state’s granting of nationality to a
person unless there is a genuine link between that person and the nationality-granting state. Nottebohm
Case (Liech. v. Guat.) (Second Phase), 1955 I.C.J. 5, 11 (Apr. 6).
179
M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No. 2, Order of Jan. 18, 1999, 3 ITLOS Rep.
1, 47.
180
The Tribunal stated:
The conclusion of the Tribunal is that the purpose of the provisions of the
Convention on the need for a genuine link between a ship and its flag State is to
secure more effective implementation of the duties of the flag State, and not to
establish criteria by reference to which the validity of the registration of ships in a
flag State may be challenged by other States.
Id. at 42.
181
United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, Feb. 7, 1986, 26 I.L.M.
1229. For further discussion of this convention, see Moira L. McConnell, “Business as Usual”: An
Evaluation of the 1986 United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, 18 J. MAR.
L. & COM. 435 (1987).
182
United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, supra note 181, at art. 4.
183
Id. at art. 19.
184
United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XII-7&chapter
=12&lang=en (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (listing countries that have signed or ratified the convention).
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involving pirate radio stations broadcasting into state territory from
offshore is instructive. Pirate radio saw its zenith in Europe in the mid1960s.185 In reaction to the sedate, state-owned-monopoly radio stations
found in most of Europe, the pirate stations emulated mainstream
American stations, playing rock with disc jockeys.186 By locating offshore,
the pirate ships broadcasted in apparent violation of a tight-knit scheme of
national, regional, and international regulations that divided bandwidth and
often-protected state-owned stations from competition.187 Stopping these
broadcasts proved difficult.188 Suggestions that the coastal state could
exercise jurisdiction over these vessels were countered by the argument
that the flag state enjoyed exclusive enforcement jurisdiction.189 In many
cases, the broadcasters would take on a flag of convenience from a state
with no ability or inclination to enforce restrictions on unauthorized
broadcasting.190
The 1965 European Agreement for the Prevention of Broadcasts
Transmitted from Stations Outside National Territories (“European Pirate
Radio Agreement”) requires that signatory flag states punish pirate
broadcasters found on their own ships.191 Article 2 provides that each state
criminalize pirate stations on its vessels and aircraft192 and make

185

See Robertson, supra note 75, at 75–76 (noting that the two most successful pirate radio
stations in Europe during this time had “an audience of over 8,000,000 listeners”). According to
Robertson, the first pirate broadcasting began in the late 1950s and mostly ended by 1979. Id. at 71.
186
Id. at 72.
187
Reuland, supra note 170, at 1224–25. For additional discussion of pirate broadcasting and
international law, see N. March Hunnings, Pirate Broadcasting in European Waters, 14 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 410, 410–20 (1965); Robertson, supra note 75, at 72–76; H.F. van Panhuys & Menno J. van Emde
Boas, Legal Aspects of Pirate Broadcasting: A Dutch Approach, 60 AM. J. INT’L L. 303, 309–11
(1966); Delbert D. Smith, Pirate Broadcasting, 41 S. CALIF. L. REV. 769, 769–72 (1968); Mitchell J.
Hanna, Comment, Controlling “Pirate” Broadcasting, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 547, 547–48 (1978).
188
See Reuland, supra note 170, at 1225 (“Efforts to curb pirate radio have so far met with limited
success.”).
189
Id.
190
See id. (“Often . . . the pirate broadcasting ship is registered to a state unable or simply
unwilling to cooperate in the suppression of this activity.”).
191
European Agreement for the Prevention of Broadcasts Transmitted from Stations Outside
National Territories arts. 2–3, opened for signature Jan. 22, 1965, 634 U.N.T.S. 239. Article 1
provides:
This Agreement is concerned with broadcasting stations which are installed or
maintained on board ships, aircraft, or any other floating or airborne objects and
which, outside national territories, transmit broadcasts intended for reception or
capable of being received, wholly or in part, within the territory of any Contracting
Party, or which cause harmful interference to any radio-communication service
operating under the authority of a Contracting Party in accordance with the Radio
Regulations.
Id. at art. 1.
192
Article 2 provides, in part: “Each Contracting Party undertakes to take appropriate steps to
make punishable as offences, in accordance with its domestic law, the establishment or operation of
broadcasting stations referred to in Article 1, as well as acts of collaboration knowingly performed.”
Id. at art. 2(1).
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Collaboration includes:

a. the provision, maintenance or repairing of equipment;
b. the provision of supplies;
c. the provision of transport for, or the transporting of,
persons, equipment or supplies;
d. the ordering or production of material of any kind,
including advertisements, to be broadcast;
e. the provision of services concerning advertising for the
benefit of the stations.194
Article 3 then requires that each signatory apply the law to nationals on
its “territory, ships, or aircraft” and outside its territories who violate the
laws “on any ships, aircraft or any other floating or airborne object.”195 In
addition, the state must apply the law to non-nationals “on its territory,
ships or aircraft, or on board any floating or airborne object under its
jurisdiction.”196 The agreement does not allow enforcement against a
foreign flagged vessel, even if the flag state is a signatory.197 Thus,
although the agreement creates an obligation to prescribe and enforce laws
against private radio broadcasters and their collaborators under traditional
jurisdictional notions, it does not expand the state’s jurisdiction to handle
the pirate radio problem. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom used such
restrictions effectively against pirate radio stations transmitting into
England.198
The European Economic Community members brought the pirate radio
broadcasts issue to the UNCLOS negotiations.199 Without opposition and
little discussion, Article 109 was adopted,200 requiring that all states
cooperate to suppress “unauthorized broadcasting from the high seas”201
193

Id.
Id. at art. 2(2).
Id. at art. 3(a).
196
Id. at art. 3(b).
197
Article 3, which contains the Convention’s application terms, makes no provision for
enforcement on foreign flagged vessels, absent another traditional basis of jurisdiction. Id. at art. 3.
198
See Howard A. Bender, Note, The Case of the Sarah: A Testing Ground for the Regulation of
Radio Piracy in the United States, 12 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 67, 88–89 (1988) (arguing that the United
States should adopt legislation similar to the British law).
199
Robertson, supra note 75, at 99.
200
Id. at 99–100.
201
Article 109 of the UNCLOS provides:
1. All States shall cooperate in the suppression of unauthorized broadcasting
from the high seas.
2. For the purposes of this Convention, “unauthorized broadcasting” means the
transmission of sound radio or television broadcasts from a ship or installation on
the high seas intended for reception by the general public contrary to international
regulations, but excluding the transmission of distress calls.
3. Any person engaged in unauthorized broadcasting may be prosecuted before
194
195
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and allowing prosecution of such activities by the flag state, the state of
registry, the state of which the violator is a national, the state receiving the
unauthorized broadcast, or any state with which legitimate broadcasting is
interrupted.202 These jurisdictional states may board, arrest, and prosecute
the perpetrator and confiscate her equipment.203 This provision can be
used against any UNCLOS party, currently 160 nations.204
With the advent of satellite radio, the Internet, and other developing
dissemination technologies, the need for tight control of unauthorized radio
Nevertheless, these provisions indicate how an
has lessened.205
international body might address the data ship problem.
V. SERVER SHIPS, CYBERLAW, AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
The ocean-based server ship benefits Internet users, the Internet itself,
the environment, and the vessel’s owner. Internet users are always seeking
more bandwidth, and the ability to move the server ship freely across
previously unavailable expanses should decrease the distances that
information must cross.206 More server farms could further increase the
growth of cloud computing.207 In addition, emergency responders and
military leaders will value the ability to provide computing power on
site.208 More data centers, in previously untapped areas, will make the
Internet a more effective medium for communication and world trade.
Additional server farms will create new pathways through which
information can flow, allowing for greater speed and reliability.209 These
advantages will ultimately inure to the server ship owner, who will profit
from the better service to customers and will also benefit from decreased
the court of:
(a) the flag State of the ship;
(b) the State of registry of the installation;
(c) the State of which the person is a national;
(d) any State where the transmissions can be received; or
(e) any State where authorized radio communication is suffering interference.
4. On the high seas, a State having jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 3
may, in conformity with article 110, arrest any person or ship engaged in
unauthorized broadcasting and seize the broadcasting apparatus.
UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 109.
202
Id. at art. 109(3).
203
Id. at art. 109(4).
204
These nations include convenience-flag states such as Liberia, Honduras, the Bahamas, St.
Vincent & the Grenadines, Belize, and Panama. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=
UNTSONLINE&mtdsg_no=XXI~6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en#Participants (last visited
Jan. 15, 2011) (listing the parties to the UNCLOS).
205
See Robertson, supra note 75, at 71−72 (noting that pirate radio filled a need not met by
“existing broadcasting facilities” at the time of its peak in popularity).
206
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
207
See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text.
208
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
209
See supra notes 22–34 and accompanying text.
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energy costs for powering and cooling the servers.
Apart from these practical advantages, the floating farms will also
promote environmental efficiencies. Perhaps the biggest land-based server
problem has been the adverse environmental impact. Data centers are
energy hogs, producing tremendous amounts of heat.210 Using renewable
power resources, such as the wind, waves, or tides, will greatly reduce the
environmental impact of these servers. The same can be said of using
ocean waters to cool the servers.
In general, traditional notions of prescriptive jurisdiction will allow
coastal states to regulate the server ship’s activities.211 A territorial effects
test should allow states to create the applicable norms.212 The information
being sent into the receiving state would satisfy the effects requirement.213
The state’s ability to regulate the conduct of its nationals or vessels
provides another basis for effective prescriptive jurisdiction.214
Enforcement presents more difficult questions. Within the inland and
territorial seas, these vessels should presume that the full force of the
coastal state is available.215 With the exception of resource issues, such as
energy production, the vessel should be able to exercise high seas freedoms
in the EEZ and over the continental shelf. In the contiguous zone, the
coastal state can exercise jurisdiction to prevent violations of a limited
group of laws in the territorial sea; rarely would a server ship be
affected.216 Although a data center vessel on the high seas should be able
to act independently of any jurisdiction other than its flag state,217 other
states will be motivated to attempt regulation.
Interesting similarities exist among these high seas rights and those
espoused by some Internet law writers. Rejection of territorial control was
a central tenet of early Internet thinkers,218 who argued that the sheer
210

See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 61–92 and accompanying text.
212
See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
213
See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
214
See supra notes 71–78 and accompanying text.
215
See supra notes 111–42 and accompanying text.
216
See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.
217
See supra notes 166–71 and accompanying text.
218
GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 53, at 13−14; Thomas Schultz, Carving up the Internet:
Jurisdiction, Legal Orders, and the Private/Public International Law Interface, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L.
799, 802 (2008). As Johnson and Post stated in their influential article:
Cyberspace radically undermines the relationship between legally significant
(online) phenomena and physical location. The rise of the global computer network
is destroying the link between geographical location and: (1) the power of local
governments to assert control over online behavior; (2) the effects of online behavior
on individuals or things; (3) the legitimacy of a local sovereign’s efforts to regulate
global phenomena; and (4) the ability of physical location to give notice of which
sets of rules apply. The Net thus radically subverts the system of rule-making based
on borders between physical spaces, at least with respect to the claim that
Cyberspace should naturally be governed by territorially defined rules.
211
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number of transnational Internet communications would make it
impossible for national governments to control them.219 The Internet’s
very structure, with its ability to route communications around blocked or
non-functional grid portions, would make it impossible for governments to
interfere.220 Because the physical location of the machine providing the
network is unimportant,221 some concluded that the Internet itself should
provide its own governance, not subject to national jurisdiction.222 One
influential Internet writer, John Barlow, relied on the natural law of the
Internet, to create the often-cited Declaration of the Independence of
Cyberspace:
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants
of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of
Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave
us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no
sovereignty where we gather.
We have no elected government, nor are we likely to
have one, so I address you with no greater authority than that
with which liberty itself always speaks. I declare the global
social space we are building to be naturally independent of
the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no moral
right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of
enforcement we have true reason to fear.
Governments derive their just powers from the consent of
the governed. You have neither solicited nor received ours.
We did not invite you. You do not know us, nor do you
know our world. Cyberspace does not lie within your
borders. Do not think that you can build it, as though it were
a public construction project. You cannot. It is an act of

David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1367, 1370 (1996).
219
GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 53, at 2; see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 3
(2006) (“The claim for cyberspace was not just that government would not regulate cyberspace—it was
that government could not regulate cyberspace. Cyberspace was, by nature, unavoidably free.”).
Professor Lessig points out the inconsistency in relying on nature in this context:
Nature. Essence. Innate. The way things are. This kind of rhetoric should raise
suspicions in any context. It should especially raise suspicion here. If there is any
place where nature has no rule, it is in cyberspace. If there is any place that is
constructed, cyberspace is it.
Yet the rhetoric of “essence” hides this
constructedness. It misleads our intuitions in dangerous ways.
Id. at 31.
220
GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 53, at 2–3.
221
Johnson & Post, supra note 218, at 1370–71.
222
Id. at 1387–91.
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nature and it grows itself through our collective actions.

This idealistic optimism was soon met with a dose of reality.224
Through technical Internet developments, the state is now able to
determine the Internet user’s identity, location, and activities.225 Although
the nation-state cannot likely control every Internet element, states can
regulate intermediaries such as Internet service providers, search engines,
financial providers, and even websites with property or people within the
state, making it possible for the nation to exercise jurisdiction over these
Internet choke points.226 After all, Internet service is simply not possible
absent territorial contacts with the ultimate user. State desire to control,
along with technological developments allowing Internet providers to
differentiate regional access, have created the expectation of compliance
with local regulations.227 Of course, in many instances a state will lack the
necessary connection to control Internet entities.228 Even so, the threat of
control combined with the ability to tailor Internet content provides a
powerful combination for the application of national norms.
This ability to use coercive measures at certain links in the Internet
chain may be part of what motivates Google to look to alternatives
apparently beyond national reach.229 As discussed above, server ships
223
John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html.
224
See Schultz, supra note 218, at 804 (describing the global response to online communication
as from other countries as “a movement for cultural and nationalistic withdrawal”).
225
See LESSIG, supra note 219, at 43–56 (describing the methods by which Internet users can be
identified).
226
See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
227
Of course, there are those that resist this level of local control. See, e.g., David G. Post,
Governing Cyberspace: Law, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 883, 889–94 (2008)
(describing competing theories regarding jurisdictional control over Internet content). This Article
takes no position on the wisdom of applying national laws to the Internet versus an Internet providing
its own governance, only recognizing that current developments seem to establish that nations do have
the ability to regulate many facets of cyberspace.
228
See id. at 892 (quoting a professor who argues that for “almost all [Internet] users, there will be
no threat of extraterritorial legal liability because of a lack of presence in the regulating jurisdictions”).
229
Google’s recent dispute with China over Internet censorship, ending with Google closing down
its China search engine, is but one example of the reasons why Google may wish to escape the bonds of
national jurisdiction. Google has rerouted traffic to its site in Hong Kong, which is not subject to
censorship. Elinor Mills, In Post-Google China, Censorship Is Unfazed, CNET NEWS (Mar. 26, 2010,
4:14 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-20001212-245.html.
The author describes China’s sophisticated ability to stop undesirable Internet traffic:
There are a handful of Internet access “choke points” in China, where all the
traffic enters and exits to the outside world. “All countries connect virtually all of
their IP addresses through at most dozens of ISPs, but China’s network is the most
centralized of any large country, with only four ISPs connecting more than 90
percent of its IP addresses to the rest of the Internet,” Roberts said.
The Great Firewall is the system of gateways, routers, and servers that China
uses to keep objectionable content from reaching users inside the country.
Authorities mirror the stream of traffic flowing into the domestic Internet and
determine what portions of a Web page the government wants to block, Lih said.
If the traffic is blocked at the domain name system level, users may get a “site
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operating on the seas owe their duty of loyalty primarily to their flag state,
a relationship with relatively little international regulation.230 Despite
states’ efforts to assert national jurisdiction over greater parts of the seas,
Grotius’s classic view of mare liberum continues to provide open access to
important routes of international intercourse today. Most of the world’s
trade moves by ship.231 International rules allowing national interference
over this crucial highway of commerce could have a detrimental effect on
the global economy. To the extent that the law of the sea expands the right
of non-flag states to stop vessels, it could create a drag on trade; after all,
the impressive expansion of global commerce since World War II,
including development of national economies around the world, is
undoubtedly due in no small part to the free movement of goods across the
oceans.232 Today, the massive amounts of oil and natural gas moved by
ships create a special concern for maintaining the unfettered flow of
energy, a strategic resource.233 In addition, territorialization of the seas
could limit access to a large portion of the earth’s surface, hindering
research and development.
The free movement of naval vessels is important to national and
international security. Although state jurisdiction may prove helpful in
protecting coastal state security, it may collectively have a detrimental
effect on international security arrangements.234 To the extent that U.S.
and other naval vessels may be prohibited from crossing the seas, they may
be less responsive in dealing with emergencies, including humanitarian
missions, U.N. enforcement actions, and peacekeeping efforts.235 If denied
access, more powerful nations may feel the need to use military force
against assertions of national jurisdiction, leading to unnecessary
not found” message; if the IP address is blocked the message may say “site
unreachable;” and if the URL is blocked or a page contains sensitive content a
“connection reset error” message may be displayed, according to Lih.
“China’s Great Firewall system is so sophisticated and massive, it can tailor
blocking for each individual Web surfer because it monitors a person’s surfing
activity to sites outside of China’s domestic Internet, right down to what’s contained
inside the web page . . . .”
Id.

230

See supra notes 173–84 and accompanying text.
The International Maritime Organization estimates that more than ninety percent of world
trade moves by ship. Int’l Maritime Org., Introduction to IMO, IMO.ORG, http://www.imo.org (last
visited Jan. 15, 2011) (follow “ABOUT IMO” hyperlink).
232
See S. Jayakumar, Keynote Address, in CENTER FOR OCEANS LAW AND POLICY, FREEDOM OF
SEAS, PASSAGE RIGHTS AND THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 17, 18 (Myron H. Nordquist et
al. eds., 2009) (“The navigational freedoms and passage rights which are guaranteed by
UNCLOS have, in my view, underpinned this unprecedented period of global economic growth and
prosperity . . . .”).
233
See id. at 19 (“[N]avigational freedom is . . . vital to the energy security of States given that
much of the world’s energy resources are transported around the globe by sea.”).
234
See Oxman, supra note 108, at 840–41 (discussing the importance of global mobility as a
means of responding to security threats).
235
Id.
231
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conflict.
The twentieth century saw the largest grab for national control of
maritime territory since Grotius’s time. The territorial sea, which was
traditionally limited to the three-mile range of ancient cannon, grew to
twelve miles in the UNCLOS.237 New entities for state control were
created for the contiguous zone, EEZ, and continental shelf.238 As one
author explained:
The territorial temptation thrust seaward with a speed and
geographic scope that would be the envy of the most
ambitious conquerors in human history. The effective start of
this process—President Truman’s claim to the continental
shelf in 1945—was so quickly accepted and emulated by
other coastal states that the emergence of the regime of the
continental shelf, in derogation of the principle of mare
liberum, has been cited as an example of instant customary
law. The Truman Proclamation unleashed a quarter-century
of territorial and quasi-territorial claims to the high seas so
vast that, at the dawn of the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea, the leader of the Canadian delegation,
Ambassador J. Alan Beesley, could quip that he comes to
bury Grotius, not to praise him.239
By the century’s end, high sea freedoms, both in terms of territory and
substance, had seriously declined. One might argue that modern problems
require this additional exercise of jurisdiction by coastal states.
Establishing an EEZ will encourage the efficient utilization of resources.240
Maritime pollution needs to be controlled.241 Radio pirates are a nuisance.
On the other hand, does it make sense to address these complex challenges
by expanding national jurisdiction over huge portions of the world’s
waterways?
How will the international community react to the new technologies
that are venturing out onto the seas? The reaction to pirate radio stations
provides an intriguing clue. The European Pirate Radio Agreement
236

Citing André Siegfried, Professor Dupuy notes that “wars took place to block maritime routes
and political strategies attempted to protect them.” RENÉ-JEAN DUPUY, THE LAW OF THE SEA:
CURRENT PROBLEMS 9 (1974).
237
See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text.
238
See supra notes 143–53 and accompanying text.
239
Oxman, supra note 108, at 832 (footnotes omitted). Another claims that following the
UNCLOS, the “concept of the freedom of navigation has now become obsolete.” Hasjim Djalal,
Remarks on the Concept of “Freedom of Navigation”, in CENTER FOR OCEANS LAW AND POLICY,
supra note 232, at 65, 74.
240
See DAMROSCH, supra note 118, at 1416–17 (describing how exclusive zones protect states’
interests in the viability of living resources in adjacent waters).
241
UNCLOS pollution provisions can be found at Articles 217 through 233. UNCLOS, supra
note 15, at arts. 217–33.
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provides that each signatory state agrees to criminalize certain behaviors
under its own laws and enforce them against its citizens and vessels, using
a traditional jurisdictional model for the prevention of pirate
communications.242 Prescriptive jurisdiction will generally exist to
regulate the abhorred conduct. Although enforcement jurisdiction issues
will continue to exist, the treaty recognizes that these can often be resolved
by restricting the collaborators’ land-bound activities.243 By cutting the
pirate station off from personnel, equipment, services, and supplies, the
agreement makes it difficult for the pirate to continue her behavior.
Punishing land-based advertisers makes a bad situation even worse by
cutting off the pirate station’s financial lifeline. Assuming the signatories’
good-faith compliance, the treaty provides an effective mechanism for
controlling unauthorized radio communications. The European Pirate
Radio Agreement does this without curtailing high seas freedoms, making
no attempt to provide the coastal state with additional zones of jurisdiction
or undercut the flag states’ rights to exclusively control vessels of their
own nationality. The Europeans adopted a narrowly-tailored plan that was
to address the specific issue that faced them without altering the basic
tenets of the law of the sea.
Article 109 of the UNCLOS takes a different tack. Rather than leaving
the enforcement of broadcasting laws to traditional notions of international
jurisdiction, it allows any state receiving the unauthorized transmission or
experiencing interference with its own legitimate broadcasts to arrest and
seize persons or vessels on the high seas. Article 109 does not require that
the flag state give permission or even receive notice before enforcement
actions are taken.244 This is a radical change in the notion of freedom of
the seas. Pirate radio stations are being treated in much the same way as
piracy or the slave trade, even though the implicated issues are far less
serious than these heinous crimes. One author has questioned the wisdom
of allowing additional state jurisdiction over pirate radio operators:
[A]rticle 109 establishes a troubling precedent. If the nations
of the world, particularly those that regard themselves as
guardians of the freedom of the seas, are willing to
accept such a significant exception to the principle of the
exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state over ships on the high
seas on the basis of such weak justification to solve a largely
nonexistent problem, other steadfastly held principles may be
in similar jeopardy. One can hope that article 109 does not
represent a general trend away from exclusive flag-state
242

Supra notes 185–98 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 185–98 and accompanying text.
244
UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 109.
243
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jurisdiction . . . .

Indeed, Article 109 has been cited as support for the general
proposition that the international community is now willing to contravene
mare liberum by extending national jurisdiction over vessels on the high
seas.246 In the end, the jurisdiction provided to the coastal states constitutes
a major diminution in high seas freedom, a freedom whose traditional
exclusions had previously been limited to flag state jurisdiction, piracy, the
slave trade, and self-defense.247
Any extension of state jurisdiction over the ocean must balance the
need for regulation against the benefits of preserving the traditional
freedom of the seas. If the threat is particularly dangerous, new
international solutions may be needed. Key issues such as marine
pollution or preservation of world fishing stocks may provide a legitimate
argument for some contravention of high seas freedoms. Other problems,
such as pirate radio, do not present the same level of danger to the world
community. High seas freedoms, and their related benefits, are far more
compelling in the international context than any barriers created by
exclusive flag state jurisdiction against enforcement of unauthorized
broadcasting. This is particularly true when one considers that the
European Pirate Radio Agreement can effectively control the pirate radio
problem without undercutting crucial international legal principles. The
agreement permits states to enforce their laws within their territories and
on their ships, and they can pursue entities within their jurisdiction that
support the outlawed activity, even when that activity falls outside the
jurisdiction.
To the extent these problems are caused by the flag system’s failure to
provide reasonable rules for nationality and regulation of ships, these
should be addressed.248 Strengthening genuine links requirements and
enforcing the flag state’s regulatory obligations are a much more direct
way of addressing the problems created by flags of convenience.
It is impossible to foresee the future technologies that will find their
way to the oceans. Clearly, the Internet has had a much greater impact on
the human condition than pirate radio stations ever did. The next invention
or discovery may be even more significant. In any of these cases, the same
analysis should apply.
Freedoms should be preserved unless an
overwhelming need to curtail them outweighs the crucial trade and security
interests protected by high seas freedoms. In the pirate radio or server ship
245

Robertson, supra note 75, at 100.
See, e.g., Christopher P. Mooradian, Note, Protecting “Sovereign Rights”: The Case for
Increased Coastal State Jurisdiction over Vessel-Source Pollution in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 82
B.U. L. REV. 767, 787 (2002) (arguing in favor of additional state jurisdiction over pollution in the
EEZ).
247
Robertson, supra note 75, at 99.
248
See supra notes 172–84 and accompanying text.
246
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situation, no such need exists because the state already has an effective
mechanism for controlling local radio or Internet content through
traditional jurisdictional means. Now that Internet providers can identify
where a user is located, the Internet has become more territorial in nature.
A user doing a search in Europe will see very different results than those
the same search produces in the United States.249 Moreover, the websites
are likely to be in the user’s language,250 and the substantive content will
be different, as well.251 The technology that allows such differentiation
also permits a provider to create websites that comply with local laws,
eliminating the likelihood of being pulled in different directions by diverse
cultures and legal systems.252 No longer a unique entity, the Internet
operates in the physical world, and like any business entity, a participant
must comply with the countries’ laws where they do business.
This new Internet also means that the local government can assert its
own laws. Internet access necessitates intermediaries who are subject to
local jurisdiction. There will be Internet service providers, search engines,
advertisers, and merchants, all of whom may be subject to local
jurisdiction. These would be similar to the collaborators targeted by the
European Pirate Radio Agreement. To the extent that any one of these can
escape the jurisdiction, others will still be subject to national regulation.
Since other remedies already exist, there is no compelling policy for a
derogation of high seas freedoms.
Assuming that an extraordinary need for more dramatic action did
exist, it is important to consider what standards should guide that response.
Greater state control of the seas is not necessarily the best way to solve the
international problems created by the Internet. Ideally, global issues call
for systemic solutions on a worldwide basis, as opposed to numerous,
probably inconsistent, restrictions. Even if individual coastal states enact
regulations, they may lack the resources or will to protect the identified
interest. The extension of EEZ rights to coastal states, for example, has not
effectively remedied over-fishing and resource utilization issues.253 In
addition, it cannot be assumed that the coastal state will use its newfound
power appropriately. A nation lacking resources may be unable to enforce
newly-acquired jurisdictional bases. Another state with less than noble
motivations may use its extended reach to harass shipping, making trade
249

See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 53, at 61 (describing how technology allows Google to
target ads geographically).
250
See id. at 50–51 (describing how Microsoft and Yahoo!, for example, have created multiple
versions of their products written in different languages).
251
See id. at 51 (“[L]ocal variations translate into different preferences and expectations among
Net users in different places.”).
252
See id. at 58–60 (describing methods of online geographical identification).
253
See Donna R. Christie, It Don’t Come EEZ: The Failure and Future of Coastal State Fisheries
Management, 14 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2004) (discussing the continuing decline of EEZ
fisheries stocks).
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more difficult. Finally, states may use legitimate extensions of jurisdiction
as an excuse for ever-expanding claims for additional power. These
potential—and even likely—eventualities underscore the wisdom of
protecting long-valued freedoms rather than pushing them aside to give
states more options for local enforcement.
The UNCLOS has given unprecedented control to the states, and
Article 109 is a prime example of this unnecessary and undesirable
cession. By subjecting valuable international interests to greater state
control, the convention is subverting hundreds of years of history to the
coastal states’ relatively shortsighted demands. Although it is hard to
imagine reaching complete worldwide agreement on Internet content, new
international mechanisms could still eventually be created to regulate
agreed-upon core Internet principles.254 The primary issue is not the law of
the sea, but the Internet’s content and control. As a result, the resolution
should not interfere with high seas freedoms. For the most part, national
rules can be enforced under current jurisdictional norms to reflect the
needs of varying communities. When they cannot, an international
solution should be narrowly tailored so as not to undercut the longstanding
premise of mare liberum. High seas freedoms helped make global
commerce the success it is today; a policy that advocates a lesser vision of
ocean access would be a profound mistake.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since before the time of Grotius, a battle has raged between those who
advocate high seas freedoms to facilitate international commerce and
security and those who prefer to carve the oceans’ regions into separate
fiefdoms. The former view minimizes each individual nation’s control in
favor of global systematic efficiencies; the latter puts a premium on state
power at the expense of international cooperation. For most of modern
history, mare liberum has been the rule, but the twentieth century saw
major encroachments on this notion. The UNCLOS embodies many of
these, extending coastal state jurisdiction to include a wider territorial sea,
a contiguous zone, the EEZ, and the continental shelf. In addition, high
seas freedoms have been minimized to deal with problems such as marine
pollution and pirate radio stations.
Today, technology is changing the face of commerce from moment to
254
One thing that both Internet idealists and those claiming that the Internet is subject to the same
jurisdictional issues as any other business seem to agree on is that an international solution harmonizing
various national approaches to Internet problems would be inadvisable. See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra
note 53, at 150–52 (“[D]eeply held differences in values, even among democracies, lie behind conflicts
of laws. A bordered Internet is valuable precisely because it permits people of different value systems
to coexist on the same planet.”); Post, supra note 227, at 894 (stating that few people give credence to
the argument that a single global law governing the Internet is the correct solution).
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moment, and undiscovered developments lie just beyond the horizon.
Numerous new ideas for ocean use are at hand, including the notion that
the seas would be an excellent location for movable server farms, powered
and cooled by renewable ocean resources. Portable and green, these server
ships may attempt to avoid state control over the Internet, just as Internet
pioneers saw cyberspace as a place free from traditional national norms.
Nevertheless, as international networks have evolved, states have insisted
that the Internet be responsive to local laws reflecting domestic concerns.
The data center vessel might be an effective strategy to reclaim some of the
freedom envisioned in earlier times.
Although server ships could probably not avoid national jurisdiction to
prescribe their behavior, enforcement could prove to be another matter. A
server ship operating under the high seas regime would most likely be
exclusively subject to the flag state’s enforcement power; adversely
affected states accordingly could not pursue violations of local laws. In
contrast, the UNCLOS specifically empowers injured coastal states to stop,
search, and arrest vessels and personnel involved in illegal broadcasting.
This provision presents a significant departure from the traditional high
seas freedoms and the correlative policies that support them.
Because these freedoms are so important to international trade and
security, they should only be curtailed when a different international
regulatory approach becomes absolutely necessary. The harm created by
these new technologies must be weighed against the benefits preserved by
maintaining open oceans. In the case of national regulation of server
farms, the importance of the centuries-old mare liberum outweighs the
need for states to exercise local control over server ships, particularly when
the coastal state has other effective means for furthering its interests. The
Internet exists beyond the cloud; traditional jurisdictional principles should
reach one or more of the requisite service links, including Internet service
providers, search engines, advertisers, merchants, and the like. Intrastate
personnel or property of such intermediaries may also provide a basis for
enforcement jurisdiction. It may be possible for certain links to avoid local
jurisdiction, but some intrastate presence is inevitable. This will give the
nation a legitimate foundation on which to enforce its own norms without
undercutting age-old freedom of the seas principles.
New uses for the seas should always take the same balanced approach.
Before entertaining the idea of subverting high seas freedoms, the
regulatory need should be weighed against the importance of these
freedoms. Assuming there is a need for action, the international
community should be slow to grant additional state powers in derogation
of mare liberum. Instead, the international community should seek a
conclusion that more pointedly addresses the issue without denigrating the
highly-valued foundation of open-water access.

